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HOME RULE: AN ESSAY ON PLURALISM
Michael Libonati*
Abstract: Home rule can be viewed as a metaphor for the policies of decentralization and
diffusion of power. This Essay aims to rediscover some of the deep historical roots of the
policy and practice of local self-government. The Essay also explores some of the ways in
which local autonomy can be reimagined in contemporary contexts.
This Essay is the product of a tradition devoted to discourse about
politics,' a tradition whose basic commitment is to expanding the par-
ticipation of individuals in the process and substance of decisions
affecting their lives.2 From the perspective of this tradition, home rule
is concerned with the decentralization of decision-making to give a
forum to those whose lives are focused on the parochial-home, fam-
ily, and neighborhood-and thus to bring government down to where
the goats can get at it.3 Home rule also is concerned with the role that
collectivities, local government entities, play as agents and protago-
nists of concerns labeled parochial.
This Essay will discuss how we can reconceptualize the crucial rela-
tionship between centralized decision-making and the peripheral local
government. According to the conventional synthesis, modern polit-
ical society consists of the subordination of the periphery to the domi-
nant center,4 but this Essay seeks to persuade that the political process
is a dialectic of claims, an endless power struggle between center and
periphery, so that political society can be understood as "a more or
less successful aggregate of the little societies that constitute it which
enjoy a life of their own and a fair degree of autonomy."5
* Professor of Law, Temple University; LL.B. 1967, LL.M. 1969, Yale University.
1. See, e.g., H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY (1950); Long, Aristotle and
the Study of Local Government, 24 Soc. REs. 287 (1957).
2. H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, supra note 1, at XXIV; see, eg., H. LASSWELL & R.
RUBENSTEIN, THE SHARING OF POWER IN A PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL (1966).
3. The acute reader will recognize this paraphrase of George Wallace's pungent advice to
Jesse Jackson concerning how to formulate issues to appeal to the broadest spectrum of the
electorate.
4. See, eg., Shils' romantic Hegelian essay Center and Periphery in E. SHILS, CENTER AND
PERIPHERY 3-16 (1975). For an anguished jeremiad against the modernist synthesis and the role
played by jurists in deconstructing traditional communities, see Cover, Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1983).
5. Springborg, Politics, Primordialism, and Orientalism: Marx, Aristotle, and the Myth of the
Gemeinschaft, 80 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 185, 187 (1986).
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The importance of the periphery in the political process is illus-
trated by the following table from the 1982 Census of Governments,
which demonstrates a political structure shaped by localism.6
Table A. Governmental Units: 1972 to 1982
Type of government 1982 1977 1972
Total 82,341 79,913 78,269
U.S. Government_1 1 
State Governments 50 50 50
Local Governments 82,290 79,862 78,218
County 3,041 3,042 3,044
Municipal 19,076 18,862 18,517
Township_ 16,734 16,822 16,991
School district 14,851 15,174 15,781
Special district 28,588 25,962 23,885
The question remains how to understand the relationship between
center and periphery. This Essay will use political and historical
examples to point out that home rule can be located within a wider
cultural context, the dialectic between center and periphery, so that
home rule can be seen as a deep and abiding artifact of our social and
political system. This Essay also will comment, sometimes polemi-
cally, on the tradition of analytic positivism by illustrating that tradi-
tion's inability to appreciate or legitimate the practical wisdom
embedded in the values and institutions of localism.
I. TWO CONVENTIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOME RULE
Before placing home rule within a historical and political context, it
is helpful to review two perspectives on home rule: Traditional legal
analysis and a recent effort by a social scientist to broaden and revital-
ize the analytic tradition.
A. Traditional Legal Analysis
First, by viewing the periphery as essential to the dialectic between
center and periphery, we must break with traditional legal analysis,
which views the periphery as subordinate to the central government 7
and as part of a rigid hierachical system whose "ability to handle com-
6. 1 UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1982 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS VI (1983).
7. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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plex situations depends upon a simple message and upon growth
through uniform replication."' 8 The analytic tradition also is primarily
concerned with how home rule fits in with previously established legal
doctrine. Thus, legal commentators traditionally have viewed local
government as a peripheral and subordinate part of a static political
system.
The analytic tradition's inflexible synthesis also is shown by its nor-
matively tinged vocabulary of paired opposites- universal/particular,
dominant/subordinate, superior/inferior, and unity/fragmentation-
that legitimizes the claims of the central government and delegitimizes
those of the periphery.9 The style of discourse associated with tradi-
tional legal analysis, analytic positivism, also serves to maintain the
mystique of the sovereign, centralized state.' 0 Positivism's hallmarks
are clarity and orderly statement. Its aim is to winnow through
ambiguous and loose terminology by searching and discriminating
analysis in order, in the words of its greatest practitioner, to "aid in
the understanding and in the solution of practical, every-day problems
of the law."11
Home rule, however, does not lend itself to a static, positivist analy-
sis. The concerns of local government entities are parochial and
imprecise, and as such are neither coherent nor consistent. 12 Thus, as
this Essay will discuss, home rule is better viewed as an essential part
of a flexible dialectic of autonomy, interdependence, and reciprocity
between center and periphery.'13 Because the analytic tradition is
unable to recognize the flexible and essential role that local govern-
ment plays in the political process, it is not surprising that home rule
has been tried and found wanting by nearly every legal commentator
who has subjected it to the solvent of traditional legal analysis. 4
8. D. SCHON, BEYOND THE STABLE STATE 187 (1971).
9. See generally Libonati, Intergovernmental Relations in State Constitutional Law: A
Historical Overview, 496 ANNALS 107 (1988).
10. See Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New
Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429 (1987). See generally R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE
MIRROR OF NATURE (1979).
11. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16, 20 (1913).
12. See supra text accompanying note 3; infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (discussing
these parochial concerns).
13. See infra notes 28-132 and accompanying text.
14. See F. GOODNOW, MUNICIPAL HOME RULE (1897); H. MCBAIN, THE LAW AND THE
PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE (1916); J. MCGOLDRICK, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 1916-1930 (1933); Fordham & Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory
and Practice, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 18 (1948); Ruud, Legislative Jurisdiction of Texas Home Rule
Cities, 37 TEx. L. REv. 682 (1959); Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule:
A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REv. 643 (1964); Sato, "Municipal Affairs" in California, 60
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B. A Social Scientist's Perspective
Gordon Clark has proposed a highly sophisticated formulation t5 to
broaden the traditional analysis, but his perspective is insufficient
because he fails to adequately account for the dynamic interaction
between center and periphery. Seeking to extend traditional private
law analytic categories proposed by Bentham and Hohfeld to public
law questions, Clark focuses on the concept of "local autonomy." 1 6
He extracts two "primary principles of local autonomy: The power of
initiative and the power of immunity."17 By initiative, he means the
power of local government to act in a "purposeful goal oriented" fash-
ion."8 By immunity, he means "the power of localities to act without
fear of the oversight authority of higher tiers of the state." 9 Combin-
ing the principles of initiative and immunity, Clark arrives at the fol-
lowing typology:
Type 1: initiative and immunity
Type 2: initiative and no immunity
Type 3: no initiative and immunity
Type 4: no initiative and no immunity.2 °
Clark then goes on to relate these ideal types to several concrete
examples:21
Type 1: the autonomous city-state (ancient and medieval)
Type 2: decentralized liberalism
Type 3: local discretionary implementation of centrally defined tasks
Type 4: local government under Dillon's rule.22
Clark's carefully articulated scheme consists of a set of dichoto-
mized variables. As such, his static analysis fails to account for the
CALIF. L. REV. 1055 (1972); Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10
WM. & MARY L. REV. 269 (1968); Westbrook, Municipal Home Rule: An Evaluation of the
Missouri Experience, 33 Mo. L. REV. 45 (1968).
15. Clark, A Theory of Local Autonomy, 74(2) ANNALS ASS'N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 195-208
(1984); see also G. CLARK, JUDGES AND THE CITIES 6-7 (1985).
16. Clark, supra note 15, at 196-97, 199.
17. Id. at 198. Professor Clark's categories seem to this observer to be functionally equivalent
to the notions of "sword" and "shield" home rule suggested in S. SATO & A. VAN ALSTYNE,
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 216-18 (1970) and applied in Jefferson v. State, 527
P.2d 37, 42 n.26 (Alaska 1974).
18. Clark, supra note 15, at 197.
19. Id. at 198.
20. Id. at 199.
21. Id. at 200-01, 203.
22. Dillon's rule holds that statutes delegating powers to local governments ought to be
strictly construed and consist only of those powers expressly granted, necessarily implied, or
indispensable. Merriam v. Moody's Ex'rs, 25 Iowa 163, 170 (1868) (per Dillon, C.J.); I J.
DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237, at 448-51 (5th ed. 1911).
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dynamic dialectic of center and periphery and does not facilitate the
central purpose of his inquiry, which he defines as the "ongoing choice
of how we are to make and remake our institutions."23 Nevertheless,
Clark's work provides more insights into the role that local govern-
ment plays in the political process than does traditional legal analysis.
First, Clark understands that analytic categories point to, and are
rooted in, historical and political context. Second, unlike conventional
legal analysis, Clark's analysis recognizes that discourse about local
government must be enriched to encompass local government's aims
or functions, that is, those concerns labeled parochial.24 In contrast,
conventional legal discourse about home rule is deeply self-absorbed
and is concerned primarily with how this new doctrine fits in with
established doctrines or how it impacts on the judiciary as an institu-
tion. Finally, Clark recognizes that local self-government engages with
vital issues of our time: The emergence of "not in my backyard"
("NIMBY") opposition to local siting of a variety of business, govern-
mental, and government licensed facilities in the industrialized coun-
tries;25 rediscovery of the values of decentralization of power and
localism in socialist bloc countries led by Yugoslavia but now includ-
ing the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China;2 6 and the
pressures of urbanization and ethnic fragmentation on the governmen-
tal apparatus of less developed countries.27 Thus, Clark, by recogniz-
ing that any discourse on home rule must be rooted in historical and
political contexts, provides the starting point for this Essay.
II. HOME RULE: POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL
CONTEXTS
This Essay now will explore, through political and historical exam-
ples, how our political system is a dynamic dialectic of autonomy,
interdependence, and reciprocity between center and periphery28 and
how the periphery is integral to the political system and to the ancient
23. Clark, supra note 15, at 197.
24. See supra text accompanying note 3.
25. Glaberson, Coping in the Age of "Nimby, "N.Y. Timds, June 19, 1988, § 3 (Business), at 1,
25.
26. Gorbachev, for example, has recognized that "the need has fully matured to reorganize
the management of local affairs along the lines of self-government, self-financing, and self-
sufficiency." Speech at the 19th Communist Party Conference (June 28, 1988), excerpted in N.Y.
Times, June 29, 1988, § A, at 10, col. 4.
27. See P. MAWHOOD, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD (1983).
28. J. LOPREATO, VILFREDO PARETO 7-12 (1965).
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and modem task of coming to terms with the multiplicity and radical
variousness of political life.29
A. Classical Roots: Polis and Urbs
The term "autonomy" is as good a starting point as any from which
to add political and historical context to the discourse about local gov-
ernment. Autonomy is thought to be associated with the notion of
sovereignty and independence. Hence, a home rule entity is said to
seek the status of an imperium in imperio, a state within a state.30 As
such, the project of local self-government can be lambasted by posi-
tivists as juridical nonsense because sovereignty is a hierarchical and
indivisible concept.31
Current classical scholarship indicates that the term "autonomy"
originated in Asia Minor, where it was coined to express the status
granted Greek cities under Persian rule.3' Autonomy then developed
as part of the dialectic of ancient Greek international law: claims made
by weaker polities to constrain or inhibit the exercise of power by a
stronger polity. 33 Autonomy is a status conceded by a central power
to a peripheral one, "a declaration of its willingness to refrain from
exercizing [sic] the power it has, a willingness which is in control of
the major power alone and depends on the historical circumstances in
which it finds itself at any given time."34 Present at the creation of the
term autonomy are all the contemporary characteristics of the project
of local self-government: Variable content, imprecise formulation, and
contingent implementation.
Recent scholarship even reconstructs our view of the Roman
Empire, which is now characterized as a "federation of autonomous
cities" by the distinguished historian Paul Veyne.35 Veyne also has
asserted that "the city was the ultimate frame of reference for social
life just as the Empire was the ultimate framework for political life.
For it was the center for decisions in matters concerning everyday life
29. In this connection, the most interesting work has been done by those trained in
anthropology. See C. GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 167-234 (1983); Pospisil, Legal Levels and
Multiplicity of Legal Systems in Human Societies, 9 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 2-26 (1967),
reprinted in L. POSPIsIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW 97-126 (1971).
30. Vanlandingham, supra note 14, at 284-85. See generally id.
31. State ex rel. Mueller v. Thompson, 149 Wis. 488, 501-03, 137 N.W. 20, 25-26 (1912)
(Timlin, J., concurring).
32. Bickerman, Autonomia: Sur un Passage de Thucydide (1 144, 2). 35 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DES DROITS DE L'ANTIQUITE 313-44 (1958).
33. See generally M. OSTWALD, AUTONOMIA: ITS GENESIS AND EARLY HISTORY (1982).
34. Id. at 9.
35. 1 A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE 92 (P. Veyne ed. 1987).
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.... Socially, psychologically, and, not least, administratively, the
city was self-sufficient, it was autarchic in Aristotle's sense. "36
B. The Earthly Republic:37 Italian Medieval Cities
The peculiar juridical status of the medieval Italian civitas after the
reception of Roman law also manifests the dynamic and dialectic
properties of local self-government. Medieval jurists like Bartolus and
Baldus 38 confronted a Roman public law which seemed to require the
consent of the center for the creation of local political institutions,39
but nevertheless recognized the essential role played by local govern-
ment. Bartolus, for example, held that a civitas could be formed by
popular agreement without central sanction provided that it did not
tend to the injury of the nominal sovereign.' He then proceeded to
legitimate self-proclaimed local republics by recognizing their exercise
of extensive rights and privileges, including the competence to legislate
concerning their own internal concerns4" without an imperial "by
your leave." Thus, in a political context in which the center was weak,
Bartolus and Baldus incorporated a robust sense of localism into the
analytic categories that they inherited from Roman public law to facil-
itate the evolution of the dependent civitas into an autarchic, autono-
mous city-state.42
C, In English Ways
We turn next to England to add more historical context to the dis-
cussion on local government. At first blush, the relation between
center and periphery in England seems to be captured in Selden's for-
mulation circa 1650: "What makes A Citty .. .Resp[onse]: it is
according to ye first Charter which made ym a corporacon; if they be
36. Springborg, supra note 5, at 191 (translating P. VEYNE, LE PAINE ET LE CIRQUE:
SOCIOLOGIE HISTORIQUE D'UNE PLURALISME POLITIQUE 107 (1976)).
37. THE EARTHLY REPUBLIC-ITALIAN HUMANISTS ON GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY 5-6
(B. Kohl & R. Witt ed. 1978) (term denotes a turning away from Augustine's City of God). See
generally G. MAZZOTrA, DANTE, POET OF THE DESERT 107-46 (1979) (discusses extensively
the notion of community in the 12th century).
38. C. WOOLF, BARTOLUS OF SASSOFERRATO (1913); J. CANNING, THE POLITICAL
THOUGHT OF BALDUS DE UBALDIS (1987).
39. DIG. JUST. 3.4.1.
40. C. WOOLF, supra note 38, at 114-15.
41. Id. at 146-47.
42. J. CANNING, supra note 38, at 64-65, 67-68, 93-158, 185-208. It also is important to
note that analytic categories have nothing to say about how type 4 polities are transformed into
type 1 polities under Clark's analysis or about the role jurists play in blocking, fostering, or
ratifying political innovations origniating at the periphery. See supra notes 17-22 and
accompanying text (discussing Clark's categories).
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incorporated by ye name of (Civitas) then they are a City; if by ye
name of (burgum) then they are A burrough. 43 This response is very
close to pre-Bartolist Roman public law doctrine because it presup-
poses that a corporate entity can only be created by the sovereign
center." Local corporate powers are defined with reference to the
authoritative words of the charters. Selden's remarks convey the pic-
ture of a strong center dominating a weak periphery. In fact, however,
the House of Commons, at the time those words were uttered, was an
institution in which municipal governing bodies and their corporate
interests were directly represented. As Sacret noted, "[a]pproximately
four-fifths of the personnel of the house of commons were city and
borough members, who were generally elected by at most a small body
of freemen, and very frequently by the governing body alone."45 So,
too, a number of boroughs were insulated from direct royal pressure
on corporate charters because they had attained their status as a result
of prescription.46
Localism was a sufficiently pervasive value that members represent-
ing localities argued that they could not agree to amendments to the
Corporation Act in 1661 "without Breach of Trust reposed in them by
those Corporate towns they served for; as conceiving those Alterations
tend to the destroying the Charters of all Corporations."47 The com-
penetration of center by periphery was so great that in the battle with
Whig Parliamentarianism, a significant part of royal strategy was
aimed at subordinating the localities to the center not only by displac-
ing local Whig elites, but also by enlisting localities in the enforcement
of centrally determined policies.4" This experiment in central control
was swept away by the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in such a way as
to insulate English, but not colonial, local government from both cen-
tral and popular control until the passage of the Municipal Corpora-
tions Act in 1835. 4'
43. TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 30 (F. Pollock ed. 1927).
44. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
45. Sacret, The Restoration Governments and Municipal Corporations, 45 ENG. HIST. REV.
232, 234 (1930).
46. J. JONES, THE REVOLUTION OF 1688 IN ENGLAND 157 (1973).
47. Sacret, supra note 45, at 250 n.2.
48. Id. at 254; J. JONES, supra note 46, at 130-31.
49. THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY CONSTITUTION 1688-1815, at 4 (E. Williams ed. 1960).
Vol. 64:51, 19 89
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D. Cities upon a Hill.50 The American Colonies
Whether the "full hearted localism"" x of the English polity was
transplanted to its American colonies has generated substantial debate
among colonial American historians." The task of contextualizing
the project of local self-government in the American colonies is com-
plicated by the fact that two separate kinds of claims must be disentan-
gled: First, claims by the colonies (periphery) in relation to England
(center), 3 and second, claims by constituent units (county, city, and
town) in each colony in relation to the colony.
L Relationship of Colonies to England
The Glorious Revolution did not change the Crown's policy of seek-
ing to limit colonial autonomy without local consent by securing per-
manent revenues, restricting the authority of colonial assemblies,
eliminating private colonies by recalling their charters, and consolidat-
ing existing colonies into more general governments. 54 A most vexing
question concerned the right to, and extent of, colonial legislative pow-
ers. Clauses in the royal commissions of colonial governors empow-
ered them "to summon and call General Assemblies of the . . .
Freeholders and Planters within their Government, according to the
Laws and Usages of Our said Province" and to exercise, with colonial
assemblies, "full Power and Authority to make, constitute, and ordain
Laws, Statutes and Ordinances for the Public Peace, Welfare and good
Government of Our said Province, and of the People and Inhabitants
thereof"" subject to the qualification that colonial enactments could
"not be repugnant" to the laws and statutes of Great Britain. 6 The
center's claim was that all legislative powers and privileges were from
the Crown alone so that the sole basis for colonial legislative authority
50. "[fIor wee must Consider that wee shall be as a Citty vpon a Hill, the eies of all people
are vppon us .... " Sermon by John Winthrop, Governnor of Massachusetts, to passengers
aboard ship, on the voyage to New England, A Modell of Christian Charity (1630), in I THE
PURITANS 199 (P. Miller & T. Johnson rev. ed. 1963).
51. Kishlansky, Community and Continuity: A Review of Selected Works on English Local
History, 37 WM. & MARY Q. 3d Ser. 139 (1980).
52. The pertinent monographs are cited in B. DANIELS, THE CONNECTICUT TOWN 203 n.1
(1979). See generally D. ALLEN, IN ENGLISH WAYS-THE MOVEMENT OF SOCIETIES AND THE
TRANSFERRAL OF ENGLISH LOCAL LAW AND CUSTOM TO MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1981).
53. See generally J. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER (1986). Much of the subsequent
discussion of this topic summarizes Greene's work.
54. Id. at 7-18. See generally THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION IN AMERICA (M. Hall, L. Leder
& M. Kammen ed. 1964).
55. J. GREENE, supra note 53, at 29.
56. Id. at 29-30.
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was to be found in royal charters and commissions.57 Thus, any ten-
dency by the periphery to expansive construction of their derivative
legislative powers was checked by the Privy Council because colonial
laws either did not come into effect without the Council's approval or
could be quashed by it upon appeal from colonial courts.58 The colo-
nial counterargument was founded on a liberal and latitudinarian con-
struction of empowering documents coupled with an appeal to English
birthright and immemorial custom. 9 Greene neatly summarizes the
situation in the 1760's:
Notwithstanding this lack of theoretical resolution or agreement as to
the actual and customary distribution of power within the empire, the
empire continued to function in practice with a clear demarcation of
authority, with virtually all internal matters being handled by the colo-
nial governments and matters of general concern by the metropolitan
government.
60
This practical, working accommodation satisfied neither the clamor
of the periphery to entrenched rights founded on constitutional princi-
ple, charter, and custom nor of the center for absolute acceptance of
its supremacy. 61 But the practice of accommodation, as Greene bril-
liantly discerns, reveals much about the role that local government
plays in the political process:
1) "sovereignty [lies] not in any institution or collection of institu-
tions at the center ... but in the separate constitutions of each of the
many separate political entities that compose[ ] the empire; ' 62
2) "political and constitutional arrangements within ... extended
polities [are] founded upon the consent of their many constituent
components; 63
3) "local sanction from the peripheries [is] essential to endow any
position of the center with constitutional authority-and vice versa; '
and
4) "constitutional customs and doctrines [can] emanate from
either the center or the peripheries but they [cannot] attain full consti-
57. Id. at 34.
58. Id. at 30. Under current Massachusetts law, the Commonwealth Attorney General has
the power to disapprove local legislative enactments inconsistent with state law. E.g., Town of
Amherst v. Attorney Gen., 398 Mass. 793, 502 N.E.2d 128 (1986).
59. J. GREENE, supra note 53, at 37-42, 175-76.
60. Id. at 76.
61. Id. at 82-85, 106-07.
62. Id. at 128.
63. Id. at XI.
64. Id.
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tutional authority outside the area of emanation... until they [are]
accepted by all parties to which they might apply."65
These points add support to this Essay's goal of illuminating the
significance of local government in the political process.66
2. Relationship Between Colony and Town
The internal dynamics of colonial polities do not lend themselves to
easy generalization. Variety and ambivalence then, as now, character-
ized the crosscutting relationship between central and local govern-
ment. The most extensively investigated colony is Massachusetts.
Reports from the scholarly battlefield resemble nothing so much as the
tale of Rashomon. Some see a highly centralized oligarchy impressing
itself on a passive, malleable local template. 67 Others glimpse the efflo-
rescence of a decentralized, particularist political order in which the
concerns of the periphery predominated. 6  Though these visions
apparently conflict, they probably can be reconciled by one more
learned than the writer by fitting them into a Hegelian or evolutionary
periodization such that centralization is inevitably followed by decen-
tralization, leading to a synthesis in which the national identity dis-
places more parochial systems of governance. 69  Thus, either
perspective is part of the same uniformitarian, positivist impulse. This
65. lIL
66. In addition, these points provide the transformative grammar to replace the positivist
vocabulary of traditional legal analysis. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. The
points also are maxims that teach us much that we need to know about designing decentralized
institutions while minimizing recourse to force. We ought to deviate from these maxims of
prudence and practical reason only when necessary to achieve overriding goals of public order.
67. Rg., G. HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLIER MASSACHUSETTS 77-78 (1960); 1
H. OSGOOD, AMERICAN COLONIES IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 432 (1904).
68. Kg., M. ZUCKERMAN, PEACEABLE KINGDOMS (1970); Breen, Persistent Localism:
English Social Change and the Shaping of New England Institutions, 32 WM. & MARY Q. 3d Ser.
3 (1975). By way of contrast, early scholarly work on local government in the United States
sought to root these institutions in the primordial practices of the Anglo-Saxon race. G.
HOWARD, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LOCAL CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 10-18, 50-56 (1889). See generally Demophilus, The Genuine Principles of the Ancient
Saxon or English Constitution, in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING
ERA 1760-1805, at 340-63 (C. Hyneman & D. Lutz ed. 1983) (recommends that the
Pennsylvania Constitution be formulated in accordance with Saxon political institutions).
69. Consider Chief Justice Parker's rejection of the contention that the town of Fairhaven was
with authority to expend funds to defend itself when threatened with invasion by British troops
during the war of 1812.
By the Constitution of the United States, this duty [to defend against an enemy in the time
of war] is devolved upon the national government, and although it may be impracticable, in
so extensive a territory, to furnish competent security to every section or point, yet it does
not follow that corporations of limited powers, like towns, can take upon themselves the
duty, and exact money of their citizens for the execution of it.
Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 271, 279-80 (1816).
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impulse, whether oriented toward claims of the center or the periph-
ery, makes us forget that governmental form and function is a largely
accidental and temporary hodgepodge and is not, as positivism seeks
to establish, a coherent and consistent body of eternal truths.7°
E. Early State Constitutions
Key issues between center and periphery prior to the American
Revolution include the following: The basis of representation in the
colonial legislature, the scope of local legislative jurisdiction, the defi-
nition and control of the local franchise, and the creation and control
of local offices. No discernible pattern emerges, although in the first
flush of state constitution-making, some of these issues were
entrenched in the constitutions of the several states.
A significant guarantor of local autonomy in Massachusetts, as in
England, was the practice of affording each town the corporate right
of electing a representative to the General Court.71 This right was
entrenched in the Constitution of 178072 as was the more curious, to
modern eyes, local prerogative of giving binding instructions to their
representatives.73
The phenomenon of self-created, self-defined local government may
be found in Connecticut, 74 but it was temporary and irregular. The
general pattern was for the central legislature to pass more enabling
legislation delegating greater discretionary powers to town officials.75
One should not, however, forget that the colony or province was
sometimes so weak that it was possible for dissenting counties to
secede and form separate polities as did Delaware (from Pennsylvania)
and Vermont (from New York and New Hampshire).76 But the city-
state form is absent.
70. See R. RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 26, 30-31 (1982). Professor Perry
Sentell is a vigorous and articulate exponent of this viewpoint. See generally P. SENTELL,
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL LAW: CURRENT TRENDS AND PROBLEMS (1971); P. SENTELL, STUDIES
IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (1973).
71. J. POLE, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN ENGLAND AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 52-54 (1966).
72. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, ch. 1, § 3, art. II, reprinted in 3 F. THORPE, THE FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES 1898 (1909).
73. MASS. CONST. of 1780 pt. I, art. XIX, reprinted in 3 F. THORPE, supra note 72, at 1892.
See generally D. LUTZ, POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL: WHIG POLITICAL
THEORY IN THE EARLY STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1980).
74. B. DANIELS, supra note 52, at 13.
75. Id. at 90-91.
76. P. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 126-45 (1983).
Vol. 64:51, 1989
Home Rule: An Essay on Pluralism
Connecticut furnishes an instructive lesson in the vagaries of par-
ticipatory localism. Far from simple consolidated local polities, by
1733 all towns in Connecticut held 1) proprietors' meetings which had
jurisdiction over the use of town land and unreviewable discretion as
to whether to confer the status of proprietor on newcomers;
2) freemen's meetings at which deputies to the General Assembly and
statewide officers were elected (the town selectmen possessed formal
power to admit to the status of freemen); 3) militia meetings mandat-
ing all men between sixteen and sixty to bear arms, to take part ifn
regular training exercises, and to elect their own officers, subject to
confirmation by the state; and 4) town meetings in which inhabitants
who were neither freeman nor proprietors also had a vote.77 In addi-
tion, local congregational societies were separately established in a
defined territory often coextensive with the town and empowered to
levy and collect taxes for the support of the minister, the
meetinghouse, and schooling. 78 Because these societies were the polit-
ical arm of the parish, eligibility for participation in society's affairs
depended on whether one had been admitted to the status of commu-
nicant in the church.
As for local offices, arrangements ran the gamut from centralization
to localism. In New Jersey, many local officials were appointed by the
governor or the legislature well into the nineteenth century.79 In Vir-
ginia, members of the county court "held in its hands all the reins of
local government" and were formally appointed by Governor and
Council, but in practice "county magistrates filled vacancies among
themselves virtually by co-optation."80 In New York, the Constitu-
tion of 1777 guaranteed that town clerks, supervisors, constables, and
collectors were subject to local popular election whereas sheriffs and
coroners were appointed by the center.81 In Pennsylvania, however,
sheriffs and coroners were subject to direct annual election in each city
and county.82
The first state constitutions were not devoid of provisions pertinent
to the project of local self-government. A twentieth century scholar,
77. See B. DANIELS, supra note 52, at 119-39.
78. Id. at 94-118. See generally Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 292 (1815)
(describes rights of parish in Vermont).
79. Attorney Gen. ex rel Booth v. McGuinness, 78 N.J.L. 346, 355-56, 75 A. 455, 459-60
(1909).
80. J. POLE, supra note 71, at 156.
81. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, arts. XXIX & XXVI, reprinted in 5 F. THORPE, supra note 72, at
2634.
82. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. X, § 31, reprinted in 5 F. THORPE, supra note 72, at 3089.
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who observes that local government powers were "missing"83 from
these texts, ignores the important and controversial entrenchment of
local corporate representation in the state legislature and the extension
of the franchise to the selection of local officials.
It was the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 which brought order and
form to the eccentric legacy of institutions of local governance
bequeathed to the thirteen original colonies.84 To interpolate the Phi-
losopher, our colonial inheritance "can be seen as an ancient city: a
maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses
with additions from various periods," whereas the Congressional
township created in advance of settlement with its grid contours may
be aptly analogized to "a multitude of new boroughs with straight reg-
ular streets and uniform houses."85 The impact of the Northwest
Ordinance on the project of local self-government is delineated in
Merle Curti's case study of democracy in a frontier county.8 6 Curti
makes the following salient observations about local government in
Trempealeau County, Wisconsin:
Self-government did not have to be created or re-created on the Trem-
pealeau frontier-because it existed there already. We are confronted
with the semantic absurdity . . . of the frontier being self-governing
before it was settled. We find that the apparatus of county and township
government was readily available when the firstcomers arrived, and that
the county fathers promptly made good use of it.
Wisconsin law regulating the kinds and duties of local officers, the
collection of numerous taxes, and the expenditure of funds was (and still
is) most specific. Trempealeau's various officers spent nine-tenths of
their time in meeting the requirements of a code emanating from
Madison.... Trempealeau carefully conformed. One looks in vain in
Trempealeau for a frontier effort to circumvent a law defining county or
township government .... The people of Trempealeau seem to have
governed themselves contentedly within a county "constitution" they
had neither drafted nor ratified. 87
83. Herget, The Missing Power of Local Government: A Divergency Between Text and Practice
in Our Early State Constitutions, 62 VA. L. REV. 999 (1976). I also have sinned in this regard.
Libonati, Reconstructing Local Government, 19 URB. L. 645, 647 (1987).
84. The text of the Northwest Ordinance is now most readily accessible in 1 P. KURLAND &
R. LERNER, THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 27-29 (1987). For our purposes, there are two
relevant provisions. Section 8 authorizes the governor "to lay out the parts of the district in
which the Indian titles shall have been extinguished into counties and townships." Section 9 sets
forth the requirements of the franchise and for the right of legislative representation.
85. L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 18, at 8e (G. Anscombe trans.
1953).
86. M. CURTI, THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN COMMUNITY (1959).
87. Id. at 261.
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What Curti here describes is guided democracy in which a school-
marm state taught "a civic grammar composed of state, county, town-
ship, and special purpose districts" and a "fiscal syntax" for the
raising and dispersal of funds.88
F State Constitutions: The Missouri Innovation
It is interesting to note the concerns attending the entrenchment of
what has come to be known as home rule in the Missouri Constitution
of 1875. Corruption and favoritism by the state legislature in the man-
agement of the affairs of the city of St. Louis was as pervasive a theme
in the debates as recourse to the principle of local self-government.89
Indeed the principle did not carry very far since the proposed and
adopted text applied only to a single named city, St. Louis.90 The gen-
eralized remedy provided by the Convention for state legislative mis-
chief consisted of a substantive prohibition of local or special laws
changing the charters of cities, towns, or villages and a procedural
provision requiring a three-month notice to the inhabitants of a county
or city prior to the passage of local laws. 91 These provisions were
designed to curb the legislature's manifest propensity "to make
changes in the charter and organization of that city [St. Louis], which
were not endorsed by the people of the city."9" The innovative and
specific part of the package was a provision delegating "to the people
of St. Louis a power that has heretofore been possessed alone by the
Legislature," the power to make a charter.93 The delegation was
replete with procedural details prescribed as "conditions" to be met by
the city in framing and adopting the charter and any subsequent
amendments. 94 It also mandated what type of local government
organization could be adopted in the home rule charter: "[A] chief
88. Id. at 270.
89. As Delegate Todd floridly observed:
What we are asking for a place in the Constitution is stability. It is for the purpose of
establishing one local government upon a rock & not upon quicksand as it has been for the
last twenty years, to be blown over by every wind & flood of bummerisim, high fraud and
rascally speculators.
12 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, at 470-71 (I. Loeb &
F. Schoemaker eds. 1944) [hereinafter DEBATES]; see also id at 445, 462, 468.
90. MO. CONST. of 1875, art. IX, §§ 20-25. These provisions were drafted, sponsored and
debated largely on the initiative of the St. Louis delegation to the Convention. DEBATES, supra
note 89, at 473, 476.
91. DEBATES, supra note 89, at 477 (remarks of Delegate Gottschalk).
92. Id at 449-50 (remarks of Delegate Hale).
93. Id at 467 (remarks of Delegate Taylor of St. Louis); see also id. at 459-60 (remarks of
Delegate Gantt).
94. Mo. CONST. of 1875, art. IX, §§ 20-22.
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executive and two houses of legislation, one of which shall be elected
by general ticket." 95 That the tutelary state had not chosen to relax its
grip on St. Louis is demonstrated by two clauses.
First, charter provisions had to be "in harmony with and subject to
the Constitution and laws" of Missouri.96 That is, whatever principle
of local self-government was embodied in the constitutional text had
neither the scope nor the dignity routinely accorded other constitu-
tional precepts. Structural arguments were precluded as was the bal-
ancing or harmonization of conflicting constitutional claims. The
courts were invited not only to overturn local initiatives on constitu-
tional grounds, but also on the ground that they were not in harmony
with general laws. The charter clearly was subordinated not only to
every other provision of the constitution but also to any general law,
including those laws that classified cities by population. As one dele-
gate remarked:
The General Assembly is the only law making power of the state & if
they find that this scheme does not work well all they need to do is to
pass a general law that in all cities or counties having over 100,000
inhabitants the law shall be so & so; & it will operate directly upon the
city & county of St. Louis.9 7
To remove any doubts about legislative hegemony, the Convention
adopted a second saving clause: "Notwithstanding the provisions of
this article, the General Assembly shall have the same power over the
city and county of St. Louis, that it has over other cities and counties
of this State." 98
In 1879, the California Constitutional Convention debated a propo-
sal delegating charter making powers to the City and County of San
Francisco which its drafter copied from the- Constitution of Mis-
souri.99 Proponents of the provision argued that an express text was
necessary to resolve "a very serious question with regard to the power
of the Legislature to delegate its authority."" Opponents, dubbed
95. Id. art. IX, § 20; see also id. § 22.
96. Id. art. IX, §§ 20, 22, 23.
97. DEBATES, supra note 89, at 476 (remarks of Delegate Fyan). The Missouri Supreme
Court held in Kansas City v. Stegmiller, 151 Mo. 189, 52 S.W. 723 (1899), that home rule cities
constitute 5 class concerning which the legislature is free to enact legislation without violating
the constitutional prohibition against local or special legislation.
98. Mo. CONST. of 1875, art. IX, § 25.
99. 2 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE
OF CALIFORNIA 1059, 1060 (1881) (remarks of Delegate Hager); see also id. at 1063 (remarks of
Delegates Brown and Reynolds).
100. Id. at 1060 (remarks of Delegate Barbour).
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"sycophants of centralism" by their adversaries,1° 1 invoked the spec-
tres of "secession '' 102 and the flagrant corruption of big city govern-
ment.103 These charges widened the debate from the particular status
of San Francisco to the principles of localism as expounded by de Toc-
queville 1° and the theory and spirit of the principle that "local legisla-
tion ought to be left to the localities which it is intended to affect."'' 0 5
Accordingly, the Convention adopted a provision which gave any city
the option of framing a charter "consistent with and subject to the
Constitution and laws of this state."1"6
Although subsequent state constitutional formulations have pur-
ported to commit to a more expansive notion of local autonomy,1"7
recent state constitutions have rejected these models in favor of a ver-
sion that firmly establishes local subordination to the center.'0 8
G. Contemporary Notions of Home Rule
We turn to a discussion of home rule in its contemporary context by
discussing the scope of home rule in the Illinois Constitution, the role
that courts have played in shaping the scope of home rule, and meth-
ods for implementing a dialogue between the center and the periphery.
L The Illinois Constitution
The Illinois Constitution provides a particularly interesting example
of how to create and implement a robust notion of home rule. Section
six of the Local Government article of the Illinois Constitution
addresses the most salient issues.
The first issue revolves around the self-reflective question, "How are
decisionmakers to read the empowering text?" The blunt answer is
that "[plowers and functions of home rule units shall be construed
liberally,"' 1 9 thus extinguishing Dillon's rule of narrow construction
of grants of power to localities. 10
101. Id. at 1063 (remarks of Delegate Howard of Los Angeles).
102. Id at 1061 (remarks of Delegate Hale).
103. Id. at 1062 (remarks of Delegate Freeman).
104. Id. (remarks of Delegate Howard of Los Angeles).
105. Id. at 1063 (remarks of Delegate Winans).
106. Id. at 1064.
107. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a); COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6; OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 3,
7. I am indebted to Professor Eugene Jacobs of Brigham Young University Law School for
furnishing me with his compilation of State Constitutional Provisions Relating to the Basic
Powers of Local Government as of October, 1985. See generally Callies, Home Rule, in 1 LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW ch. 4 (C. Sands & M. Libonati eds. Supp. 1987).
108. E-g., MONT. COmST. art. XI, § 6. See generally Vanlandingham, supra note 14.
109. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6 (in).
110. See supra note 22 (discussing Dillon's rule).
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The second issue has to do with the scope of home rule powers.
Here, the results are mixed. We are told that "a home rule unit may
exercise any power or perform any function" subject to the limiting,
and potentially deconstructive l" qualifications that the power or func-
tion be "pertaining to its government and affairs.""' 2 The grant of
power, however, expressly includes the power to tax and to incur
debt," 3 which are the attributes of fiscal autonomy without which
home rule would be meaningless in practice." 4
The third issue is the problem of state legislative hegemony over
home rule entities, which the Illinois Constitution addresses in detail.
The following language drives the attenuated subtleties of the doctrine
of implied preemption out of circulation: "Home rule units may exer-
cise and perform concurrently with the State any power or function of
a home rule unit to the extent that the General Assembly by law does
not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the
State's exercise to be exclusive."'' 5
2. Judicial Influences
Courts, aided and abetted by the academic bar, " 6 have not uncom-
monly regarded themselves as stewards of the center, quick to overrule
local initiatives which directly or indirectly impede the "implementa-
tion of statutes which sought to further a specific statewide policy,"" ' 7
in order to assure the uniformity and supremacy of state law vis-a-vis
local enactments. This stance ignores the state's interest in supporting
effective local government, and in encouraging localities to develop
their own decisionmaking mechanisms governing their own institu-
tions. 8 Courts also fail to pay attention to the "structures of normal-
ity"' ' when wielding the doctrine of implied preemption of the field.
111. See City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel Inc., 261 So. 2d 801, 803 (Fla. 1972)
(adopting a narrow construction of the term "municipal functions" in FLA. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 2(b)).
112. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a).
113. Id.
114. Cohn, Municipal Revenue Powers in the Context of Constitutional Home Rule, 51 Nw.
U.L. REV. 27 (1957); Walker, Toward a New Theory of Municipal Home Rule, 50 Nw. U.L.
REV. 571 (1955).
115. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(i).
116. E.g., Sandalow, supra note 14. Contra 1 C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW
§ 5.41, at 5-196 (1988).
117. Jefferson v. State, 527 P.2d 37, 44 (Alaska 1974).
118. See Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1485 (1987).
119. A. MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 24-25 (1988). On normality
as a social construct, see generally E. DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD
47-75 (S. Solovay & J. Mueller trans. 8th ed. 1962).
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For example, the California Supreme Court invalidated a local ordi-
nance criminalizing "resorting" for the purposes of unlawful sexual
conduct on the ground that the state's Penal Code preemptively regu-
lated criminal aspects of sexual activity.120 But nearly every significant
aspect of criminal law enforcement reflects a norm of decentralization.
Typically, local residents summon local police, who are overwhelm-
ingly recruited from local residents, to exercise discretion, informed by
local customs and mores, 121 in arresting suspects. Charges against
suspects are screened by locally elected prosecutors or a grand jury
drawn from a local venire and tried before a local petit jury and, in
many states, a locally elected judge. Displacement of the investigatory
jurisdiction of local police, the local prosecutor, or local courts are all
extraordinary acts, sparingly invoked and less often granted. The Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court's result is predicated on an unrealistic com-
mand/control model of the relationship between center and periphery.
By salutary contrast, the Illinois approach requires that the displace-
ment of home rule authority be a considered, deliberate act of the leg-
islature,122 in some cases calling for a three-fifths supermajority. 123
3. Implementing a Dialogue Between Center and Periphery
Some significant guarantors of a mature dialogue between center
and periphery would include the following: 1) recognition of a local
government unit's standing as a collective entity to challenge the con-
stitutionality of a state statute under both the state and federal consti-
tution, 124 2) compelling the state to fund legislation mandating new or
increased levels of activities or service by local government,1 2 and
3) recognizing that a local government unit is privileged to expend
funds to engage in a wide variety of lobbying activities with state and
federal executive and legislative branches of government concerning
the passage and implementation of legislation. 126
Entrenching such claims of the periphery in a constitutional text is
attractive because of the Nietzschean tendency of central elites to
despise the ordinary, the fallible, and the contingent. Entrenchment,
however, can lead to attempts by a group of law trained specialists to
120. In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 372 P.2d 897, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1962).
121. See Black, Common Sense in the Sociology of Law, 44 AM. Soc. REV. 18 (1979).
122. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(h) ("The General Assembly may provide specifically by law
for the exclusive exercise by the State of any power or function of a home rule unit . .
123. Id. art. VII, § 6(g).
124. Libonati, supra note 83, at 655-56.
125. Mo. CONST. art. X, § 21.
126. See generally Burt v. Blumenauer, 299 Or. 55, 699 P.2d 168 (1985).
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dominate discourse about governmental structure and function and to
sentimentalize their monopoly of access to courts by elevating the judi-
ciary's role in the policy making process. Thus, nonconstitutional
methods of securing the claims of the periphery may be more
workable.
It is therefore fitting to end this paper with a description of a New
Jersey statute, which is a wholly nonconstitutional mechanism for
implementing the dialogue of center and periphery.127 The subject of
the statute lies squarely athwart the intersection of NIMBY'28 and
technological rationalism: the siting of hazardous waste facilities. The
approach adopted by New Jersey mediates between "straight state pre-
emption" of local regulatory authority and "straight preservation of
local veto authority." '29 The statute calls for the state Department of
Environmental Resources to adopt technical siting criteria.1 3' The
Department then prepares a plan designating sites based on these cri-
teria and projected needs. Instead of relying solely on individuals
affected by the site designation plan to participate in further adminis-
trative hearings on the proposed site designation, the statute recog-
nizes that the affected municipality ought to be recognized as a
responsible protagonist in the process. But the rhetoric of localism-
not in my back yard--does not persuade in a universe of discourse
created by a statute couched in the language of technical rationality
and administered by professionals trained in that neutral and detached
vocabulary. Hence the statute provides for state grants to enable
affected municipalities to hire the expertise necessary to participate
meaningfully in the adjudicatory hearing prior to the inclusion of the
site on a list of recommended sites.13' The availability of state funding
indicates that the state regards the locality as a responsible and
responsive partner in the decision-making process, not a mere pawn to
be mobilized to carry out the purposes of the center. Further, state
funding assures that these hazardous waste facilities will not be
dumped on poorer communities unable to mobilize the resources, both
financial and scientific, of a municipality like, say, Princeton. And
when an applicant seeks a state permit, the affected municipality has
not only a right to review the application, but also to receive funds
127. Those interested in a fuller exposition of alternative center-local decision-making
structures are urged to consult Tarlock, State Versus Local Control of Hazardous Waste Facility
Siting: Who Decides in Whose Backyard, in RESOLVING LOCATIONAL CONFLICT 137-58 (R.
Lake ed. 1987).
128. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
129. Tarlock, supra note 127, at 142.
130. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:lE-57.a. (West 1988).
131. Id. § 13:lE-59.d.
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from the applicant to finance that review. 3 2 This elaborate structure
is predicated on the simple, homely insight which informs the project
of local self-government-whoever must wear the shoe knows best
where it pinches.
III. CONCLUSION
By placing home rule in a political and historical context, this Essay
has explored how home rule is part of the dialectic between center and
periphery, and as such is an integral part of our social and political
system. Along the way, this Essay also has engaged with the analytic
positivism of traditional legal analysis to show how positivism, is
unable to conceptualize or appreciate the importance of localism in
our political process. By showing how home rule is an integral part of
our political system, this Essay provides the starting point for a sys-
tematic inquiry into the policies justifying local institutions. But it is
ohly a matter of taste whether one's convictions are predicated on pos-
itivist grounds (the statute or constitutional provision says so), on
communitarian or civic republican principles (participatory democ-
racy), on the justification of efficiency (public choice theory), on vulgar
pragmatism (centralization doesn't work), on Durkheimian grounds
(local government is a by-product of the division of governmental
labor), or on institutional grounds (don't waste the state legislature's
time on local issues; keep judges out of policy making). All roads lead
out of Rome as well as into it.
132. Id. § 13:1E-60c.(4).
